A Bayes probability computer program was written in Fortran to examine issues related to genetic paternity testing. An application was given to demonstrate the effects improper assumptions of prior probability of culpability. The seriousness of such errors include the potential of assigning paternity to wrongly accused men, or wrongly refuting paternity.
Introduction
Genetic testing has been widely used in criminal cases as well as in cases involving establishment of paternity. In the United States, the incidence of paternity cases appears to be very large especially when compared to live birth rates. For example, the Centers for Disease Control re ports that there were 3,959,417 live births nationally dur ing calendar year 1999 (Ventura, Martin, Curtin, Menacker, & Hamilton, 2001 ). Among these births, a total of I,308,560 (33%) were delivered by unmarried women. Unpublished data from The Wayne County Circuit Court, located in Southeastern Michigan, notes that there were II,104 case filings during the year 2000 (Wayne County Circuit Court, 2001 ). Case filings are generated when le gal paternity has not been established.
Every legal practitioner dealing with genetic test ing in either a criminal or paternity context should know how this testing can lead to incorrect conclusions. The sta tistical assumptions made during paternity testing can cause the results of testing to be misleading and unreliable. Al though the focus of this article is on a serious error in sta tistical methodology frequently occurring in paternity test ing, the same error may also occur in criminal DNA Ernest P. Chiodois a physician and an attorney. He is board certified in internal medicine, occupational medicine, pub lic health, and general preventive medicine. Contact him at 25656 Schoenherr, Suite B, Warren, MI 48089, E-mail: echiodo@pol.net. Joseph L. Musial, Ph. D., is an Educa tion Specialist for the Department of Internal Medicine at Henry Ford Health System, Detroit, MI. J. Sia Robinson is an instructor at East Side Academy, Detroit Public Schools, and adjunct lecturer, College of Education, Wayne State University. The authors acknowledge Jerome J. Fekin, Jr., for providing the case filing data, and Nicol R. Shamey, Plymouth-Canton, MI, School District. testing with dire consequences. An attorney practicing criminal or family law needs to understand the statistical assumptions that may cause the results of genetic testing to be misleading and unreliable. This understanding allows the knowledgeable advocate an opportunity to dispute test ing results that are commonly and wrongly assumed to be infallible.
The mathematics in this article is limited in scope to the application of a simple formula. In addition, there is incentive to engage in the minimal mental effort needed to understand this article, because it provides the thoughtful attorney with a powerful advocacy tool. The central issue is the common error of assuming equal prior (pre-test) prob abilities for an event in the face of ignorance concerning the actual probabilities. This common error called the "prin ciple of indifference" may cause genetic testing using Bayes formula to be misleading (Issac, 1995) . The probability of the event A is written as P (A) and operates under the condition: 0 < P (A) < 1.0. An impossible event has a probability of zero and a certain event has a probability of 1.0. Probabilities are mutually exclusive, which means there is no overlap. Tossing a coin illustrates this concept. There can be only one possible outcome: heads or tails. However, rarely are events dichotomous, straightforward probabilities. Instead, there are frequently a significant number of previous research findings with different probability levels.
This provides the entry point of Bayesian statis tics. Thomas Bayes was an 18th century English clergyman who devised a formula to generate a conditional probabil ity (Borowski & Borwein, 1991; Freund, 1973) . The basic tenet of Bayesian statistics is the inclusion of conditional or prior probabilities. Often, the prior probabilities are not mechanically or deterministically generated, but rather, are based on expert judgment. Motulsky (1995) noted "usu ally the prior probability is not a real probability but is rather a subjective feeling. Some statisticians (Bayesians) think it is okay to convert feelings to numbers ("99% sure" or "70% sure"), which they define as the prior probability. Other statisticians (frequentists) think that you should never equate subjective feelings with probabilities" (p. 145).
The field of inferential statistics maintains a cer tain element of inaccuracy. Specifically, there are two types of errors associated with hypothesis testing: (1) a Type I error, or "false-positive", which occurs when a researcher asserts that there was a significant finding when in fact none existed; and, (2) a Type II error, or "false negative", which occurs when a researcher fails to observe a signifi cant difference.
The following medical example illustrates the inherent problems associated with conditional probabili ties. Assume that a 40 year-old female, who resides in an upper middle class suburb, presents with a newly diag nosed case of lung cancer to her primary care physician. The physician may use conditional probabilities generated by the Centers for Disease Control in order to determine the national incidence of this type of lung cancer among 40 year-old females. This approach appears reasonable, but caution is in order. During the history and physical, the patient may have failed to report that her former resi dence of many years was located near a toxic waste dump. This means that the history of environmental exposure may have contributed to the presenting cancer growth. By not including this in the construction of the prior probability, the physician may fail to consider other comorbid diseases associated with environmental exposure.
The problems associated with Bayesian statistics are also relevant to paternity cases. Suppose a man is ac cused of being the father of a child. He is found to have a genetic marker that only occurs in 1% of the male popula tion. The child is tested and is also found to have the same genetic marker. The mother does not have the genetic marker. It is known that whenever a father has the marker it is always passed to the child. In this case the man contests paternity. Let: P(A') = The assumed prior probability before testing that the man is not the father.
Bayes formula is as follows:
In this case P(B/A) is 1 because there is a 100 % probability that the child will get the genetic marker if the man is the father*. P(B/A') is 0.01 because the child has the same probability of having the genetic marker as the general population (one percent) if the man is not the fa ther.
Recognize that only P(A) and P(A') need to be identified before plugging the values into Bayes formula. P(A') is simply 1 -P(A)**. Therefore, all that remains is to identify P(A). P(A) is the assumed probability prior to testing that the man is the father of the child. In paternity testing this is often assumed to be 50% (.50). This assump tion is made because there is a controversy concerning pa ternity. The mother of the child claims that the man is the father. The man claims that he is not the father. A prior (pre-test) probability of 50% is assumed as a default value for P(A).
If the above values are entered into Bayes for mula the following result occurs: Therefore, there is a greater than 99% probabil ity of paternity when using a prior (pre-test) probability of 50% (P(A) = 0.5).
The JointAMA-ABA Guidelines (Hummel, 1976; Kilmer, 1993) for likelihood of paternity are in Table 1 . A = The man is the father of the child B = The child has the same genetic marker as the man A' = The man is not the father of the child P(A/B) = The probability that the man is the father of the child given that the child has the same genetic marker as the man. P(B/A) = The probability that the child will have the same genetic marker as the man given that the man is the father. P(B/A') = The probability that the child will have the genetic marker given that the man is not the father. P(A) = The assumed prior probability before test ing that the man is the father. In Michigan, paternity is presumed when the DNA profile determination determines a probability of pa ternity of 99% or higher (Hummel, 1976; Kilmer, 1993) . In Michigan, blood tests for paternity are generally admis sible in evidence at trial (Kilmer, 1993) . Consequently, the man in the above example would be presumed under Michi gan law to be the father of the child.
However, the results will change drastically if a lower prior (pre-test) probability of paternity is used. In stead of a 50% prior (pre-test) probability of paternity as sume that P(A) is 0.001. This change to a low prior prob ability changes the results of Bayes formula. The change in the prior probability results in only a slightly greater than 9% probability of paternity. This would not result in a presumption of paternity and would in most cases be viewed as strong evidence against pater nity.
The drastic change in probabilities that occur with a change in prior (pre-test) probability highlights a serious error in statistical methodology known as the "principle of indifference" (Isaac, 1995) . The principle of indifference is the error of assuming equality when the actual prob abilities are unknown. In paternity testing the prior (pre test) probability is often assumed to be 50%. This assump tion is made because the true probability of paternity is not known. The mother claims that the man is the father. The man denies paternity. Because it is not known who is tell ing the truth a fifty-fifty split on the prior (pre-test) prob ability is made. However, this assumption about the prior (pre-test) probability P(A) may cause a highly misleading result as the above example illustrates.
It is well known by statisticians that the principle of indifference is a serious methodological error. If there is no knowledge concerning the prior (pre-test) probabil ity it is better to make no assumptions rather than to as sume a 50-50 chance based on ignorance. Such an error leads to an assumption of a high probability that is trans formed by the mathematics to an even higher probability (Isaac, 1995) . A man who is able to present credible evi dence that he never previously met a woman should not be assigned a prior (pre-test) probability of 50% of being the father of her child. A 50% prior (pre-test) probability is an arbitrarily value set at an unreasonably high level. Con versely, if a woman is able to produce credible evidence that she was alone with a man in an isolated location dur ing the time period of conception, she is entitled to a prior (pre-test) probability of greater than 50%. This is needed because an inappropriately low prior (pre-test) probability can result in a misleadingly low test result. In both of the above cases the application of the principle of indiffer ence lead to misleading results with tragic consequences.
Methodology
A Bayes probability computer program was written using Fortran 90. A total of 27 prior probabilities ranging from 0.001 to 0.90 were loaded into the program. A prior prob ability curve was plotted using the resulting probabilities. The Fortran 90 computer program appears below:
program one implicit none real::p(27) real: :ba,bal ,pp,ppp integer: :i open( 1 ,file='probs' ,status='new') !p(27) is array of prior probabilities !pp is prior probability !ppp is resulting probability !ba is P(B/A) value of 1 !bal is P(B/A') value of .01 ba=1.0 bal=.01 p(l)=.001 p(2)=.002 p(3)=.003 p(4)=.004 p(5)=.005 p(6)=.006 p(7)=.007 p(8)=.008 p(9)=.009 p(10)=.01 p(ll)=.02 p(12)=.03 p(13)=.04 p(14)=.05 p(15)=.06 p(16)=.07 p(17)=.08 p(18)=.09 p(19)=.l p(20)=.2 p(21)=3 p(22)=4 p(23)=5 P(24)=.6 p(25)=.7 p(26)=.8 p(27)=9 !Call prior probabilities from array, do i=l, 27 pp=p(i) ! Calculate resulting probability ppp=((ba)*(pp))/((ba)*(pp)+(bal)*(l-pp)) write(*,*) 'For a prior probability of:',pp write(*,*) 'the resulting probability is:',ppp write(*,*) write(*,*) IWrite results to external file. write(l,10) pp,ppp 10 format (2f8.4) end do stop end program one
Results
The probabilities ranged from 0.091 to 0.9989 and were negatively skewed. (See Figure 1 on next page .) The dis tribution begins to rapidly grow when a 0.2 prior probabil ity was loaded. The probability of 0.091 suggests that the male defendant had a 9% chance that he was the father. Michigan's prior probability of 0.5 resulted in a 99% prob ability of paternity. However, this simulation was not based upon real world prior probabilities. Instead, all prior prob abilities were arbitrarily loaded. The resulting probabili ties, or establishing paternity, ranged from 9 to 99%.
Conclusion
Genetic testing is seriously flawed when improper assump tions of prior probability of culpability are made. In the arena of paternity testing this has the great potential of as signing paternity to wrongly accused men. It also has the equally tragic potential of wrongly refuting paternity. In the arena of criminal law the same errors concerning as sumptions about prior probability present the great risk of loss of life and liberty. The skillful legal advocate must know the potential of abuse of genetic testing and be pre pared to expose the abuse when it occurs. The conditional probabilities employed by courts of law should be based upon objectivity rather than subjectivity.
The reader is invited to try various probabilities into the following Fortran 90 Bayes Probability program:
program two implicit none real::p real::pp write(*.*) 'Enter prior probability ( <3 decimals):' read(*.*) p pp=((l)*(p)/((l)*(p)+(.01)*(l-p)) write(*,*) 'The resulting probability is:',pp stop end program two Endnotes * In probability mathematics a 100 percent probability is 1. A 50 percent probability is 0.5. 
** P(A ) is the opposite o f P(A). P(A' ) is equal to one

